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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Sergio Duarte*
I wish first of all to thank Ali Shariat, the Symposium Editor
of the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal,for having invited me to
speak with you today. As many of you may know, the United
Nation's ("U.N.") Office for Disarmament Affairs attaches great
importance to disarmament and nonproliferation education,1
and this makes me all the more grateful to receive this invitation.
I also want to express my appreciation to the Fordham
University School of Law and the Nonproliferation, Arms
Control, and Disarmament Interest Group of the American
Society of International Law for recognizing the importance of
the subject of this conference, and the important role of the
United Nations in advancing multilateral disarmament efforts.
This subject is both timely and profoundly important to the
future of international peace and security. In many respects, this
year has the potential to mark a turning point in the history of
global efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. After all, the
presidents of the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, the
Russian Federation and the United States, have both jointly and
individually voiced their support for the goal of eliminating
nuclear weapons. 2 The two countries are now finalizing a treaty
* High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. Speech delivered
at the Fordham InternationalLawJournalsymposium "Nuclear Weapons and International
Law: A Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime for the 21st Century" on February 25, 2010.
1. See generally United Nations, UNODA: United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs, http://www.un.org/disarmament/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
2. See Remarks in Prague, Czech Republic, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOc. 00228, at
3 (Apr. 5, 2009) ("[T]oday I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."); U.N. GAOR, 64th
Sess., 4th plen. mtg., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.4 (Sept. 23, 2009) (statements of Russian
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to replace the expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
("START"), 3 one that will further reduce deployments of
strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. 4 Other
nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty ("NPT") 5 have taken various steps to limit their own
nuclear weapons capabilities-including such actions as closing
down nuclear test sites, halting production of fissile material for
use in weapons, and eliminating entire classes of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles. Overall, declared global nuclear
weapon stockpiles have dropped considerably since the height of
6
the Cold War.
Reinforcing these activities by governments is a groundswell
of new initiatives from individuals and groups in civil society to
achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. Former senior statesmen
now in at least ten countries have authored opinion-editorials
voicing their support for nuclear disarmament, following the first
of a series of such "op-eds" originally published in the Wall Street
Journal by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and
Sam Nunn. 7 Another major initiative, the International
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,
jointly organized by Australia and Japan, has just issued a massive
study containing a detailed step-by-step proposal for achieving

President Dmitry Mevedev discussing steps to realizing global disarmament); see also
Joint Statement by President Barack Obama and President Dmitry A. Medvedev of
Russia, 2009 DAiLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 00208, at 1 (Apr. 1, 2009) (declaring that "[w]e
committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world" as a result of a meeting
in London in anticipation of the G20 Summit).
3. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R.,
art. XVII(2),July 31, 1991, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 102-20 (1991) (expiring by its own terms
fifteen years after its entry into force).
4. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Weisman, U.S., Russia Agree to Nuclear-Arms Accord-FirstSuch
Pact in Nearly Two Decades Would Cut Number of Warheads, Limit Missiles and Bombers
Delivering Them, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2010, at A9 (reporting on the final stages of
negotiations for a new arms control treaty between the United States and Russia).
5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161.
6. For current information on global levels of nuclear weapons, see Fed. of Am.
Scientists, Status of World Nuclear Forces, http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/
nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
7. See George P. Shultz et al., Op-Ed., Toward a Nuclear Free World, WALL ST. J.,Jan.
15, 2008, at Al3 (first opinion-editorial in the series).
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global nuclear disarmament. 8 Earlier this month, over 200
international political, military, business, and faith leaders
gathered in Paris for the Global Zero Summit to launch the next
phase of the Global Zero Campaign focused on the phased
elimination of all nuclear weapons. 9 Countless additional civil
society initiatives are underway around the world today, and
nuclear disarmament is also a goal that is increasingly cited as a
priority by world leaders attending the plenary sessions of the
10
U.N. General Assembly.
With all of these activities going on, one is tempted to follow
the advice of the great reggae singer Bobby McFerrin, who
famously urged, "Don't worry, be happy."'
Yet, unfortunately, there are some legitimate grounds for
worrying, both about the future of nuclear disarmament and the
role of international law in achieving it. First, let us look at some
numbers. Here we are in the year 2010-sixty-four years after the
U.N. General Assembly first identified the goal of eliminating
nuclear weapons; 12 forty-eight years after the Soviet Union and
the United States agreed at the U.N. on a joint proposal for
"general and complete disarmament" (the McCloy-Zorin joint
statement); 13 forty years after the NPT entered into force, which
committed its parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith" on
nuclear disarmament; 4 and ten years after the nuclear-weapon
8. See Gareth Evans et al., Int'l Comm'n on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers
http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/
at
available
(2009),
icnnd-report-eliminatingnuclearthreats.pdf.
9. See generally Global Zero, About the Campaign, http://www.globalzero.org/en/
about-campaign (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
10. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.8 (Sept. 25,
2009) (containing expressions of support for nuclear disarmament from ten countries
in just one assembly meeting).
11. BOBBY MCFERRIN, Don't Worry, Be Happy, on DON'T WORRY, BE HAPPY (EMI
1988).
5(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1(I) (Jan. 24, 1946) (calling for "the
12. G.A. Res. 1(I),
elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction").
13. Report of the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics to the Sixteenth Session of the United Nations GeneralAssembly on the Result of
Their Exchange of Views on Questions Relating to Disarmament and to the Resumption of
Negotiations in an Appropriate Body, Whose Composition Is To Be Agreed Upon (Joint
3, U.N. Doc. A/4879
Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations),
(Sept. 20, 1961). This speech is also available in 45 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 589-90 (1961).
14. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, art. VI.
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states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference made their
"unequivocal undertaking" 5 to accomplish the total elimination
of their nuclear arsenals-after all these years, and there are still
reportedly over 20,000 nuclear weapons in the world today, with
many still on high-alert status.1 6 The fact that we do not know the
exact number only testifies to another problem-the extremely
limited transparency over these arsenals and their associated
stocks of fissile materials.
Second, let us consider the problem of the double standard.
Critics of the NPT have often termed the treaty "discriminatory"
because it establishes a legal distinction between nuclear have
and have-not states.1 7 Though nuclear disarmament has obviously
not been achieved, the nuclear-weapon states have been asking
the non-nuclear-weapon states to agree to increased, more
intrusive controls over their own peaceful nuclear activities. This
certainly contrasts with U.N. General Assembly resolution 2028,
which, in 1965, endorsed the negotiation of the NPT, saying that
"the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual
responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear
Powers."18
Furthermore, in 1995, the states parties agreed to extend
the NPT indefinitely, 9 as part of a "package deal" that contained
several important elements-including efforts to establish a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, 20 a "programme of

15. See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 24-May 19, 2000, FinalDocument, 15(6), U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (2000).
16. See Fed. of Am. Scientists, supranote 6.
17. See, e.g., Nabil Alaraby, PracticalProblemswith MultilateralArms Control Treaties, in
UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM, GENEVA, 28 FEBRUARY-2 MARCH 1991, at 45, 48, U.N.
Sales No. GV.91.0.14(H) (1991); KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, STRENGTHENING NUCLEAR

NONPROLIFERATION 7 (1993); William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 735, 761

(1993).
18. G.A. Res. 2028(XX), 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2028(XX) (Nov. 19, 1965).
19. See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 17-May 12, 1995, Decision 3: Extension of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I: Organization
and Work of the Conference, Annex, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part I) (May 11,
1995).
20. See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 17-May 12, 1995, Resolution on the Middle
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action" to achieve the "full realization" of article VI of the treaty
dealing with disarmament,2 1 and a strengthened review process. 22
Yet today, there have been no efforts whatsoever to establish the
Middle East zone, large nuclear stockpiles remain, and the treaty
review process continues to face difficulties in eliciting hard facts
about the status of existing nuclear arsenals. These are just some
of the difficult issues that will no doubt be taken up at the 2010
NPT Review Conference which opens next May.
Third, let us consider what is often called "modernization"
of the nuclear arsenals. In the face of numerous political and
legal commitments to eliminate nuclear weapons, all of the
nuclear-weapon states have various programmes to improve,
modernize, or refurbish their nuclear arsenals and their
associated delivery systems. Experts often refer to this as the
phenomenon of "vertical proliferation," involving the continued
qualitative improvement of existing arsenals. 23 Some nuclearweapon states have tried to reconcile these goals with
disarmament by claiming that modernization will allow the
retirement of older, less safe weapon systems, or by asserting that
a more reliable nuclear arsenal will discourage allies covered by
the nuclear umbrella from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.
Fourth, let us consider what is happening with the nuclear
deterrence doctrine governing the use of such weapons. While
there are some differences among the nuclear-weapon states in
the specific circumstances that they have declared would lead to
the use of such weapons, the great common denominator of all
East, Final Document, Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference, Annex, U.N.
Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part I) (May 11, 1995).
21. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 17-May 12, 1995, Decision 2: Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 4, Final Document, Part I:
Organization
and
Work
of
the
Conference,
Annex,
U.N.
Doc.
NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part I) (May 11, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Review Conference Decision

2].
22. See 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 17-May 12, 1995, Decision 1: Strengthening
the Review Process for the Treaty, Final Document, Part I: Organization and Work of the
Conference, Annex, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part I) (May 11, 1995).
23. See, e.g.,
Epstein & Szasz, supra note 17, at 744-45; David A. Koplow, Parsing
Good Faith: Has the United States Violated Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?,
1993 WIS. L. REv. 301, 313-14; Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb:
Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 71, 77 (1995).
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of these doctrines is the claim that nuclear weapons are both an
effective and legitimate means for these states to deter nuclear
attacks upon them. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has referred
to this doctrine as "contagious"' 24 because of the historical
tendency of the deterrence doctrine to proliferate along with
their associated weapons.
Fifth, let us consider just some of the formidable challenges
facing the "rule of law" today in the field of disarmament.
Though opened for signature in 1996, the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ("CTBT") 25 has still not entered into
force. And though the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference agreed to "the immediate commencement and early
conclusion of negotiations" on a fissile material treaty, 26 such
negotiations have still not taken place despite strong support for
such a treaty worldwide. In other areas, the nuclear-weapon states
have still not ratified all the protocols to four of the five treaties
establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones-and none has
ratified the protocols to the treaties establishing such zones in
Central Asia and Southeast Asia. There are also no multilateral
treaties governing missiles or other nuclear weapon delivery
systems, and, with the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty, 27 no international treaties regulating missile defenses.
With respect to nonproliferation, the U.N. Security Council
adopted resolution 1540 in 2004, which obliged all states to enact
legislation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction or their acquisition by non-state actors. 28 Yet many
states outside the Security Council later voiced their concerns,
arguing that the Security Council was never intended to serve as
a de facto legislature for promulgating binding legal obligations
of general applicability to all member states. 29 Other
24. The Secretary-General, The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-WeaponFree World, Address to the East-West Institute, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11881, DC/3135
(Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Five-Point Address].
25. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, S.TREATY DOC. No.
105-28 (1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439.
26. 1995 Review Conference Decision 2, supra note 21, 4(b).
27. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
28. See S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
29. See IanJohnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council:Bringing
Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 290-94 (2008) (summarizing the
misgivings of Member States over the quasi-legislative nature of resolution 1540); see also
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nonproliferation concerns have arisen over reports in recent
years of actual or possible noncompliance with the NPT or its
safeguards agreements by Iraq (before the last war),30 Iran, and
Syria. 31 In 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the
NPT, and then conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.32 Also,
many non-nuclear-weapon states have still not concluded their
NPT safeguards agreements with the International Atomic
33
Energy Agency.
So, yes, there is a lot to be concerned about when it comes
to the future of nuclear disarmament. If suspicions persist about
the willingness of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their
disarmament commitments, there will no doubt be ramifications
that will take the form of nuclear weapon proliferation, as more
and more countries will come to conclude that they too must
have this highly valued, ultimate deterrent that will guarantee
national survival and protect against nuclear attacks. And as this
process unfolds, more and more weapon-usable fissile materials
will be produced, stored, and transported around the world,
which will only raise the risks of such materials being acquired by
non-state actors, and then the world would be facing yet another
nuclear nightmare.
I do not wish to be misunderstood here; I am not arguing
that the dangers I have just reviewed will in fact transpire. A risk
of something occurring is not the same as the occurrence itself,
and this brings me to the key message I wish to voice today;
namely, the persisting, even growing importance of law in the
overall process of achieving global nuclear disarmament. It is
almost as important as political will and enlightened leadership
Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, if Awkward Exercise in InternationalLaw-Making: Security Council
Resolution 1540, 51 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 411 (2004) (discussing the legitimacy of
resolution 1540 against the backdrop of resolution 1373).
30. See Int'l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net
Assessment (Sep. 9, 2002).
31. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Annual Report 2008, at 79-80, IAEA
Doc. GC(53)/7 (2009) (discussing safeguard implementation in Iran and Syria).
32. See Blaine Harden, N. Korea Conducts 'Successful' Underground Nuclear Test,
WASH. POST, May 25, 2009, at Al6.
33. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, art. III
(binding all states parties to accept a safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency). For a brief overview of the International Atomic Energy
Agency's safeguard system, see IAEA, The Safeguards System of the InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency (2007), available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/
safeg-system.pdf.
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among the nuclear-weapon states, which together are
indispensable in achieving a world without such weapons. Let me
explain.
The world community, through such means as U.N. General
Assembly resolutions and NPT Review Conference Final
Documents, has over the years identified at least five criteria to
use in assessing progress in disarmament. Verification is one of
these; it is not sufficient for states simply to declare unilaterally
that they do not have nuclear weapons, and this must be
confirmed by highly reliable and objective means. Another
criterion is irreversibility; confidence in compliance grows if
controls are sufficient to make it extremely difficult if not
impossible for a state to abandon a disarmament commitment
and build or reconstruct a nuclear arsenal. Transparency is also
essential in gauging progress in disarmament, for nuclear
disarmament will never be achieved if the world does not have
hard facts about the size of nuclear arsenals and concrete
progress being made in eliminating them. Another criterion is
universality; any agreement to achieve global nuclear
disarmament must be fully "global" in geographic scope, with no
exceptions. Lastly, the world community expects disarmament
commitments to be legally binding.
Of these, the last actually also applies to the other criteria,
for how can one realistically expect verification or irreversibility
to be reliably achieved if they are purely discretionary or
optional? Is universality simply to be achieved as a result of a
straw poll, or must it be registered in a somewhat more binding
form? Similarly, the world should not have to rely upon voluntary
declarations by states about their nuclear weapons. This is not
the way that nuclear nonproliferation policy is enforced, so why
should it be any different for disarmament?
In this sense, law is a vital ingredient in any scheme for
achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. If the international
community were viewed as on a boat heading to a world without
nuclear weapons, political will and politics would constitute its
sail, and law its anchor-and both are essential in reaching that
destination.
It is precisely because of this indispensability of law that
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon included the goal of negotiating
a nuclear weapon convention, or a framework of mutually
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reinforcing agreements with the same goal, as the first of his fivepart nuclear disarmament proposal, which he announced on
October 24, 2008. 34 Speaking just days earlier at Harvard
University, he reminded his audience, "The United Nations has
long stood for the rule of law and disarmament. Yet it also stands
for the rule of law in disarmament, which we advance through
35
our various statements, resolutions, and educational efforts."
In some respects, the entire ensemble of institutions that
comprise the "U.N. disarmament machinery" is involved, in one
way or another, in the development or strengthening of
multilateral norms for disarmament. The U.N. Disarmament
Commission and the General Assembly's First Committee are
deliberative bodies, and although neither the General Assembly's
resolutions nor the Disarmament Commission's agreed
"guidelines" are binding, they do contribute to the overall
process of defining and articulating multilateral norms for
disarmament.
The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is the world's
36
single forum for negotiating multilateral disarmament treaties.
Last month, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called upon the
conference, as it opened its current session, to "demonstrate to
the world its continuing relevance, especially in strengthening
the rule of law in the field of disarmament."' 3 7 His words of
encouragement are certainly necessary, given that the conference
has been locked in a stalemate for well over a decade due to its
inability to reach a consensus that would allow the
commencement of negotiations. It has faced such political
difficulties before, yet it, and its predecessor bodies, have been
involved in the conclusion of all the key multilateral treaties
34. Five-Point Address, supra note 24.
35. The Secretary-General, Securing the Common Good in a Time of Crises,
Speech at the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/11876 (Oct. 21, 2008).
36. See generally U.N. Office at Geneva, Disarmament: An Introduction to the
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages) /
Conference,
BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9 (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). For a list of
participants in the 2010 Conference, see Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switz.,
Jan. 18-Mar. 26, 2010, List of Participants:2010 Session, U.N. Doc. CD/INF.59 (Feb. 11,
2010).
37. The Secretary-General, Secretary-GeneralUrges Conference to Show Its Continuing
Relevance by Strengthening Rule of Law in Disarmament Field, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/12706,
DC/3208 (Jan. 19, 2010).
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dealing with weapons of mass destruction (though the NPT itself
was negotiated primarily by the Soviet Union and the United
States). The conference was able to reach agreement on a
substantive program of work last year, 38 but was unable to
implement it due to differences amongst some of its members
over some key issues and priorities. Virtually all members want to
proceed immediately with negotiations on a fissile material
treaty, but there is still no consensus among its sixty-five members
on this. Other items on the conference's agenda for substantive
discussions-but not negotiations-are nuclear disarmament,
negative security assurances, and the prevention of an arms race
39
in outer space.
Let me say that I do not believe that the obstacles to
negotiations encountered in the Conference on Disarmament
are due to any fundamental flaw in the conference as an
institution. These obstacles are due rather to differences in the
policies of its member states. Some want a treaty to cut off
production of fissile material for weapons, while others want such
a treaty to include stocks of previously produced material-and
at least one member has voiced its concern that, as proposed, the
fissile material cut-off treaty would seriously threaten its security.
There are persisting differences in priorities as well. Some want
negotiations dealing with nuclear disarmament and security
assurances, while others want to commence negotiations on a
40
treaty banning the deployment or use of weapons in space.
Progress in these areas will require some changes in state
policies.
It is of course true that there can be incremental progress in
nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation without the need for
new multilateral treaties. States can voluntarily decide on their
own-as did Libya and South Africa-to abandon nuclear
weapon programs. In 1991, the Russian Federation and the
United States undertook a series of unilateral actions that
resulted in a substantial reduction in deployments of certain
38. See Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switz., Jan. 19-Mar. 27, 2009, Decision
for the Establishment of a Programme of Work for the 2010 Session, U.N. Doc. CD/1864 (May
29, 2009).
39. See Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switz., Jan. 18-Mar. 26, 2010, Agenda
for the 2010 Session, U.N. Doc. CD/1884 (Jan. 26, 2010).
40. See generally 88 DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (2008) (presenting the differing
views within the Conference on Disarmament).
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types of short-range nuclear weapons. 41 The many difficulties of
treaty negotiation and ratification-such as we are now seeing
with respect to the CTBT-have prompted some commentators
to dismiss the need for treaties in the field of arms control, or
have inspired the negotiation of extremely brief agreements, like
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002,42 which was

about one page in length.
Yet despite the difficulty of negotiating arms-control and
disarmament treaties, the world community still recognizes their
value, as illustrated by the very fact that the Russian Federation
and the United States chose to negotiate a treaty to succeed the
START treaty43 and they have also announced they intend to
44
negotiate additional reductions by means of future treaties.
In his famous speech to the General Assembly in September
1961 announcing a detailed U.S. proposal for "general and
complete disarmament," President Kennedy stressed the
importance to disarmament of both verification and of
international law. He said, "For disarmament without checks is
45
but a shadow, and a community without law is but a shell."

As for the next logical steps forward in filling in the "shell"
of disarmament, I would of course point to the large unfinished
agenda of bringing the CTBT into force, negotiating a fissile
material treaty, completing ratifications of the Protocols to the
regional nuclear weapon-free zone treaties, and starting the

41. See, e.g.,
U.S. President George Bush, Address to the Nation on Reducing
United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 1348 (Sept.
27, 1991) (announcing the withdrawal of all tactical ground-launched and naval nuclear
weapons in hopes of Russian reciprocation). For more information on the unilateral
nuclear initiatives of the United States and the Russian Federation in the early 1990s, see
Arms Control Association, The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical
Nuclear Weapons at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance.
42. Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, U.S.-Russ., May 24, 2002, S.TREArY DOc. No. 107-08 (2002).
43. U.S. President Barack Obama and President of the Russian Federation Dmitry
A. Medvedev, Joint Statement Between the United States of America and Russia
Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms, 2009 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC.00209, at 1 (Apr. 1, 2009).
44. See Weisman, supra note 4 (announcing the prospect of "more-ambitious" arms
talks after the conclusion of a new arms reduction treaty between the United States and
the Russian Federation).
45. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1013th plen. mtg.,
42, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1013 (Sept.
25, 1961) (remarks of U.S. President John F. Kennedy). This speech is also available in
45 DEP'T ST. BULL. 619 (1961).
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process of developing multilateral legal norms for controlling
missiles and outlawing space weapons.
But looking further down the road, I think SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon got it quite right by drawing attention to
the need for a nuclear-weapon convention or framework of
agreements with a similar objective. Long-term planning should
be a near-term priority, not a long-term goal, and I think there is
much indeed to be gained just by doing some serious thinking
about what exactly would have to be included in such a
convention. The mere act of identifying these elements would
help in clarifying the work that needs to be done to conclude
and implement such a treaty. This is why I believe the "Model
Nuclear Weapon Convention" 46 being circulated by the
governments of Malaysia and Costa Rica-which was drafted by
nongovernmental experts-is a good step in the right direction.
In my opinion, it is never "too early" to start thinking about the
architecture and legal obligations that will be needed to achieve
global nuclear disarmament-it is far better to do this work early
than too late.
So let me conclude not only by thanking you for having
invited me, but also by challenging all of you here today to use
your skills to contribute in some way to the great cause of nuclear
disarmament. You can conduct in-depth research. You can
investigate. You can advocate. You can educate others. And you
can establish networks for exchanging ideas on how to advance
disarmament and the rule of law together. This is my call to
action today, for there are few things more rewarding than in
contributing to a truly great cause, and nuclear disarmament is
one of the greatest.

46. See Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, Letter dated 17 December 2007 from
the Permanent Representative of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/62/650 (Jan. 18, 2008).

